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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, liability for attorney malpractice was limited to circumstances where the claimant was in privity of contract with the attorney.' The general rule in Texas is that no cause of action in
negligence may arise from a breach of duty unless there is privity of
contract between the defendant and the injured party.' This so-called
privity doctrine has been utilized in Texas jurisprudence as a complete
defense to most legal malpractice claims for over sixty years.3 Thus, in
Texas, attorneys' exposure to malpractice is limited to actions brought
by their clients because only clients have direct contractual relationships with attorneys. Historically, this narrow confine allowed Texas
attorneys to determine whether to assume certain representations,
1. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.1 (3d
ed. 1989).
2. See, e.g., Barcelo v. Elliott, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (May 10, 1996); Dickey v.
Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.);

Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

3. See, e.g., Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Keith, 107 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1937, writ dism'd) (citing 5 TEX. JUR. Assignments to Bailment § 63,
at 473 (1930); Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Morrison, 50 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1932, no writ)).
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and moreover, to properly gauge the extent of their liability
exposure.4
Over the past forty years, however, other American jurisdictions
have expanded the scope of liability to include third parties not within
the direct attorney-client relationship. Beginning with Biakanja v. Irving,5 decided in 1958, the California Supreme Court first relaxed the
privity doctrine by allowing an intended third party beneficiary to recover against a non-lawyer for improper execution of a will.6 In
Biakanja, a notary who was not an attorney negligently drafted a will
for a testator that was invalid because the notary failed to have the
will properly attested.7 As a result, the named beneficiary received
only one-eighth of the estate by intestacy and sued the defendant for
negligence. 8 The principle issue was whether the defendant was under
a duty of care to protect the plaintiff even though they were not in
privity. 9 Predictably, the defendant-notary argued that he owed a
duty only to the cient-testator and not to the plaintiff-beneficiary. 10
Nonetheless, the California court found the defendant undertook to
provide for the formal disposition of an estate by drafting and supervising execution of a will, an important transaction requiring specialized skills, and moreover, the defendant was not qualified to
undertake such a task." The court held the defendant's conduct "was
not only negligent but was also highly improper" and "[s]uch conduct
should be discouraged and not protected by immunity from civil liability, as would be the case if plaintiff, the only person who suffered a
loss, were denied a right of action."' 2
In so holding, the California Supreme Court rejected historical precedent and announced a new standard to determine the applicability
of the privity defense in California legal malpractice cases. 13 The
court adopted a judicial balancing test that weighed the following six
factors: 1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff; 2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 3) the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury; 4) the closeness between
the attorney's conduct and the injury suffered; 5) the moral blame
attached to the attorney's conduct; and 6) the policy of preventing
future harm.14 As a result, the California Supreme Court concluded
the plaintiff should be allowed recovery "despite the absence of priv4. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 360. See Barcelo, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
at 609-10; Bell, 613 S.W.2d at 339.
5. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id at 17.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 18.
10. Id.

11. Id. at 19.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id at 19.
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ity."'1 5 Therefore, for the first time since English courts enunciated
an Amerithe privity standard more than one hundred years earlier,
16
can court broke tradition and redefined the standard.
Three years later, in Lucas v. Hamm, 7 the California Supreme
Court chose to apply the Biakanja balancing test in a suit filed by trust
beneficiaries against an attorney. In Lucas, the attorney-defendant, in
violation of instructions and in breach of contract, negligently prepared a will containing invalid phraseology under the California Civil
Code.' 8 Later, upon the will's admission to probate, the defendant
informed the plaintiffs of the will's invalid trust provision and advised
them that they would be deprived of the entire amount set out in the
trust provision unless they settled with the testator's blood relatives. 19
As a result, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement and received a lesser amount than they would have received if the testamentary instrument had been valid. The plaintiffs subsequently sued the
defendant for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant reasoning the lack of privity between the plaintiffs
defendant precluded the plaintiffs from maintaining their
and the
20
suit.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court overruled the lower
court's decision and applied the Biakanja balancing test.2 1 Noting the
similarity between the notary in Biakanja and the attorney in Lucas,
the court stated, "The same general principle must be applied in determining whether a beneficiary is entitled to bring an action for negligence in the drafting of a will when the instrument is drafted by22an
attorney rather than by a person not authorized to practice law."
However, the attorney attempted to distinguish Biakanja, arguing
the Biakanja decision should only apply to non-lawyer notaries and
not attorneys.2 3 The California Supreme Court rejected this argument
and thus overruled the absolute privity barrier with regard to attorneys.2 4 Specifically, the California Supreme' Court held that attorneys
who negligently draft wills under California law containing phraseology that proves invalid relating to restraints on alienation and the rule
against perpetuities may be held liable to third party intended beneficiaries who are injured by the attorney's negligence. 25 The court reasoned, "[t]he lack of privity between plaintiffs and defendant [should]
15. Id

16. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
17. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).

18. Id at 686.
19. Id. at 687.
20. Id at 686-87.

21. Id at 687.
22. Id at 687-88.
23. Id at 688.
24. Id

25. Id at 687-90.
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not preclude26 plaintiffs from maintaining an action in tort against [the]
defendant.
Thereafter, a trend began developing throughout many American
courts, which relaxed the privity doctrine in estate planning legal malpractice cases, particularly against attorneys accused of drafting testamentary documents which proved to be invalid or resulted in
frustration of testamentary intent.2 7 In these jurisdictions, a compensating remedy now exists for injured beneficiaries either under a third
party beneficiary theory or a negligence theory. These courts base
their reasoning on the assumption that it is the intended third party
beneficiaries, not the testators, who are injured, therefore, the beneficiaries should have standing to sue testators' attorneys for negligence.
In the remaining jurisdictions continuing to adhere to the privity
doctrine, including Texas, injured third party beneficiaries have no recourse against negligent attorneys who proximately cause their inju26. Id. at 688.

27. See Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1102 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (trustee held liable for breach of fiduciary duty for delegating trustee's
investment powers); Lucas v. Harm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962) (attorney who negligently drafts a will may be held liable to third party
intended beneficiaries); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981) (third party beneficiary may maintain negligence action against attorney for drafting invalid trust provision in a will); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983) (intended will
beneficiary may bring malpractice cause of action against drafting attorneys despite
lack of privity); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (will
beneficiary may maintain a malpractice action against attorney who drafts the will);
Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224 (Ill. 1984) (attorney held liable to intended beneficiaries for negligently drafting a will); Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1988)
(action may be maintained by will beneficiary against attorney who drafted the will on
basis that beneficiary is a known third party); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679
(Iowa 1987) (attorney may be held liable to devisee under will where attorney drafted
testator's will naming devisee to receive land and attorney subsequently aided testator
in partition sale of land); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42 (Kan. 1990) (attorney may be
liable for negligence to third party beneficiary despite lack of privity); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (attorney may be held liable for damage
caused by his negligence to intended beneficiary despite lack of privity); Succession of
Smith, 514 So. 2d 606 (La. Ct. App. [4 Cir.] 1987) (executor's attorney may be held
liable to testator's heir for failing to follow proper procedures in obtaining judgment
of possession rendered in succession proceeding); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618
(Md. 1985) (third party beneficiary may recover in negligence against attorney);
Charleson v. Hardesty, 839 P.2d 1303 (Nev. 1992) (attorney who represents a trustee
assumes a duty of care toward trust beneficiaries as a matter of law); Wisdom v. Neal,
568 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.M. 1982) (no attorney client relationship necessary for heirs to
recover from attorney who improperly distributed estate); Rathblott v. Levin, 697 F.
Supp. 817 (D.N.J. 1988) (attorney whose negligence in drafting will caused beneficiary
to deplete the estate's assets in defending will contest may be held liable to beneficiary in malpractice action despite lack of privity); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or.
1987) (attorney liable to alleged intended will beneficiary for failing to carry out direction of testator and include gifts to beneficiary); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744
(Pa. 1983) (attorney who failed to properly draft a will was held liable to will beneficiaries who lost their legacy); Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464 (Wash. 1987) (acknowledging the right of an estate beneficiary to bring a cause of action against a
negligent attorney).
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ries.2s In Texas, for example, the only parties with standing to sue for
negligence in estate planning legal malpractice cases are client-testators, who by factual circumstance must be deceased in order for wills
to become operative. Unfortunately, until a will becomes operative,
or fails to operate, there is no injury, and afterward, there is no one
remaining alive with standing to maintain the malpractice action.
Therefore, Texas attorneys escape liability while seriously injuring intended third party beneficiaries.
Today, rules concerning the extent to which attorneys may be held
liable to persons outside the direct attorney-client relationship are still
being formulated by courts throughout this country.29 Nonetheless,
the majority of modem decisions favor expanding the scope of liabil28. Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (lawyers are liable to
persons not in privity only for fraudulent misrepresentations, not negligent misrepresentations); Berger v. Dixon & Snow, P.C., 868 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (attorneys are not liable to noncients in the absence of fraudulent or malicious conduct);
Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585 (D. Haw. 1985) (attorneys not liable to third party
investors for securities fraud); Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605 (Me. 1990) (attorney
appointed in divorce proceedings as guardian ad litem of father's minor child did not
owe a duty to the father because no attorney client relationship existed); Logotheti v.
Gordon, 607 N.E.2d 1015 (Mass. 1993) (attorney of decedent whose will was determined to lack testamentary intent did not owe heirs a duty to be reasonably alert to
indications decedent was incompetent); Ginther v. Zimmerman, 491 N.W.2d 282
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (alleged unnamed intended will beneficiaries have no cause of
action against attorney who drafted will); Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v.
O'Connor & Hannan, 494 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. 1992) (a third party beneficiary may
bring a malpractice action only when the client's sole purpose was to benefit the third
party); Williams v. Bryan, Cave, McPheeters, McRoberts, 774 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (intended will beneficiaries may not bring tort action against attorneys for
negligently drafting will where will contest provides beneficiaries a complete remedy);
St. Mary's Church v. Tomek, 325 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 1982) (attorney who prepared
testator's will owes no duty to purported will beneficiaries who claim attorney negligently drafted will); Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (attorney not liable to beneficiary who brought legal malpractice action against attorney
who drafted a will because there was no privity between the beneficiary and attorney); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (indemnitor
who was found liable under indemnity agreement was not in privity of contract with
attorneys and thus could not maintain action); Lewis v. Star Bank, 630 N.E.2d 418
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (beneficiaries of a trust were not in privity with advising law
firm at time law firm allegedly failed to give settlor proper tax advice and thus could
not maintain a malpractice action); Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (federal court applying Oklahoma law held that as a
matter of law an attorney is not liable to third party with whom he was not in privity);
Barcelo v. Elliott, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (May 10, 1996) (attorney who negligently
drafts a will or trust owes no duty of care to intended beneficiaries); Atkinson v. IHC
Hosp., Inc., 798 P.2d 733 (Utah 1990) (holding state has never allowed recovery
where third party liability was at issue); Copenhaver v. Rogers, 384 S.E.2d 593 (Va.
1989) (remaindermen under testamentary trust have no cause of action against testator's attorneys for negligence due to the lack of privity); Anderson v. McBurney, 467
N.W.2d 158 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (attorney not held liable to third parties for acts
committed within scope of attorney-client relationship); Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d
196 (Wyo. 1990) (prospective lessors of ranch have no cause of action against attorney
for prospective lessees in the absence of attorney-client relationship).
29. 1 MALLEN & SMiTH, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 379.
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ity for legal malpractice beyond the narrow confines of the direct attorney-client relationship to include plaintiffs expressly intended as
beneficiaries of the attorney's retention. 0
During the past four years, there have been four important Texas
estate planning legal malpractice cases involving the privity doctrine.
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ of error in three out of four of
these cases. TWo of the cases were initially heard by the Houston First
District Court of Appeals, and one each by the Dallas and Eastland
appellate courts.
In the Dallas case, Thomas v. Pryor,3 ' the Texas Supreme Court
granted writ, but later dismissed it, remanding the case in accordance
with a settlement agreement reached by the parties.32 In the first
Houston case, Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins, the Texas Supreme
Court denied error. However, in the latest Houston case, Barcelo v.
Elliott,34 the Texas Supreme Court granted writ and decided the case
on May 10, 1996. 3s Not surprisingly, the Texas Supreme Court chose
to utilize Barcelo to reaffirm its long-standing refusal to relax the privity doctrine. In the fourth case, Oliver v. West,36 decided before the
recent Barcelo decision, the Eastland Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the 37
attorney owed no
duty to heirs who were not the defendant's clients.
The purpose of this comment is to provide future guidance to Texas
courts in structuring a bright-line rule to determine third party nonclient standing in similar estate planning legal malpractice cases as an
alternative to the current privity standard. Part I discusses and analyzes the evolution of the privity doctrine and the current theories
supporting its relaxation as it relates to estate planning legal malpractice cases, particularly circumstances involving negligently drafted or
executed wills. Part II examines the privity doctrine as it has been
applied in Texas legal malpractice cases. Part III recommends abolishing the privity doctrine in Texas and offers a new standard to assist
Texas courts in determining, with some degree of certainty and predictability, the circumstances under which negligent attorneys should
be held liable to persons not within the direct attorney-client
relationship.
30. See, e.g., Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464 (Wash. 1987); DeMaris v. Asti, 426

So.2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969).
31. 847 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), writ dism'd by agr., 863 S.W.2d 462

(Tex. 1993).
32. See Thomas v. Pryor, 863 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1993).
33. 859 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
34. No. 01-94-00830-CV, 1995 WL 51054 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,

writ granted).
35. 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (May 10, 1996).

36. 908 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, n.w.h.).
37. Id. at 631. As of the publication date, no writ had been filed in Oliver.
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I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Privity Doctrine
1. In General

The general privity doctrine as it pertains to legal malpractice is that
an attorney will not be held liable for negligence to persons other than
his clients due to the lack of a contractual relationship between the
attorney and the third party. 38 In its broadest sense, privity of contract
has been defined as a derivative interest founded on, or growing out
of, contract connection, or bond of union between the parties. 39 Thus,
historically, whether a person had standing in a negligence action was
based on the theory of duty owed to him as a result
40 of a contract, and
whether or not he was a party to that contract.
It is common knowledge that privity of contract exists when a person hires the legal services of an attorney where the retention and
services of employment are rendered for the benefit of that person.4 '
For example, in Ward v. Arnold,42 a wife retained an attorney to draft
a will for her husband, whereby she would be made the beneficiary of
the residue of his estate.4 3 The defendant, after contacting the husband to determine testamentary intent, prepared the will and mailed it
to the wife with instructions for proper execution."4 The wife, however, neglected to have the will properly executed, relying solely on
the defendant's later advice that the will was not necessary and that,
by law, if her husband died intestate, the wife would receive the residue in any event.4 5 Thereafter, the husband died and the wife failed
to receive her intended devise.46 As a result, the wife sued the defendant for negligence, alleging the defendant knew the "husband was the
owner of a substantial amount of separate property," and that if the
defendant possessed reasonable knowledge and would have exercised
"reasonable care under the standards of practice in the community,"
he should have known that under Washington probate law, if her husband died
intestate, she would inherit only half of his separate
47
estate.

In holding that the wife could maintain a cause of action for malpractice in these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Washington
stated:
38. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, § 7.10, at 376-78.
39. Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 17 F.2d 71, 75 (8th Cir. 1927).
40. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations, in The Law of
Tort, 53 AM. L. REG. 209, 214-17 (1905).
41. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, § 7.2, at 361.

42. 328 P.2d 164 (Wash. 1958).
43. Id at 165.

44. Id at 165-66.
45. Id at 166.
46. Id.
47. Id
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The complaint plainly states that the defendant's services were engaged by the [wife], that the advice was given to her, and that the
will with attached instructions was sent to her. The fact that the
defendant contacted the husband to determine whether the proposed will expressed his true intentions does not change the relationship alleged. It is not contrary to public policy for one person to
engage an attorney to write the will of another, naming him
beneficiary.48
Similiarly, Texas courts have made it clear that only clients may maintain suits for negligence against attorneys due to the existence of priv49
ity between the parties. For example, in Bryan & Amidei v. Law,
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated:
It is a general rule that the duties of the attorney which arise from
the relation of attorney and client, are due from the attorney to his
client only, and not to third persons.... No privity of contract exists
between them and the attorney. For such injuries, therefore, as
third persons may sustain by reason of the failure or neglect of the
attorney to perform a duty which he owed to
50 his client only, they
have no right of action against the attorney.
Therefore, in Texas the privity doctrine has historically served to exonerate attorneys from third party non-client liability. Moreover, proponents contend that the rule should be maintained in order to
protect the sanctity of the direct attorney-client relationship. 5 ' The
general concern is that creating a duty owed to third parties will inevitably harm attorneys' obligations of loyalty, independent judgment,
zealousness, and confidentiality owed only to their clients. 52 Furthermore, it is argued that relaxation of the privity doctrine will increase
the cost of legal malpractice insurance, resulting in an undue burden
on the Texas legal profession and possible diminution in the quality of
legal services and ultimately could make legal services more
expensive.53
2. Historical Antecedents
The privity doctrine was firmly established in the English courts by
1842.54 The precise origin of the doctrine is unclear, but the two lead48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. 435 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1968, no writ).
50. Id. at 593.
51. See Steven K. Ward, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 587, 610-11
(1978).
52. See State Bar Rules, art. X, § 9, EC5-1 (Texas Code of Professional Responsibility), reprinted in TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (West 1988); Tex.
Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct 2.01 (1989), reprinted in TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. tit. 2,
subtit. G app. A (West Supp. 1996) (State Bar Rules art. X, § 9).
53. See Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
54. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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ing decisions most influential in American jurisprudence are
Winterbottom v. Wright55 and Robertson v. Fleming. 6
In Winterbottom, a mail carrier was driving a mail coach owned and
purchased by his employer, when due to defective manufacturing, the
coach broke down, whereby the mail carrier was thrown from his seat
and suffered personal injuries. 57 The primary issue in Winterbottom
was whether the manufacturer should be held liable to the purchaser's
employee for injuries caused by the manufacturing defect. The employee mail carrier had no direct business relationship with the manufacturer, yet sought compensation from the manufacturer for his
injuries. 58 Consequently, due to the absence of a direct contractual
relationship between the mail carrier and the manufacturer, the
Winterbottom court concluded the mail carrier was prohibited from
maintaining such an action against the manufacturer.5 9 Lord Abinger,
stating this was an action of first impression, wrote for the majority:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the
plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along
the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring
a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts
as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit, would
60
ensue.

Lord Alderson, concurring with Lord Abinger, expressed the same
concern and agreed privity was a necessary requisite for standing:
If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a case, there is
no point at which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to
confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if
we go one
step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not
go fifty. 61
Likewise, in Robertson v. Fleming,62 an English court found the public
policy of limiting liability to those in privity of contract outweighed63
any need to provide a remedy for plaintiffs suffering financial loss.
In Robertson, a debtor hired a solicitor to draft a security agreement
for the benefit of his sureties.' The security agreement failed. In response, the sureties sued the solicitor for negligence. 65 Lord Camp55.
56.
57.
58.

152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
4 Macq. 167 (H.L. 1861).
Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 405.
Id.
Id.
4 Macq. 167 (H.L. 1861).
Id at 177-82.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 168.
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bell, writing for the Robertson court, stated that a duty arises only if
there is privity between the parties:
I never had any
As this duty was not imposed by any general law ...
doubt that it could be established only by showing privity of contract between the parties ...If this were a law a disappointed legatee might sue the solicitor employed by a testator to make a will in
favor of a stranger, whom the solicitor never saw or before heard of,
if the will were void for not being properly signed and attested. I
am clearly of the opinion that this is not the law ... and it can
hardly be the law of66any country where jurisprudence has been cultivated as a science.
Consequently, the court did not assign liability to the attorney for improperly drafting the security agreement.
What is most significant about the Robertson decision is that it is
one of the earliest published opinions applying the privity doctrine in
a legal malpractice case. The reason that the English court likely
placed this early limitation on recovery was because the tort of negligence was relatively new, and the English courts were concerned with
defining its scope. 67 According to one commentator, "It has been asserted that the distinctions between contract and tort law had not sufficiently matured at the time of Winterbottom and Robertson to permit
courts to properly distinguish their spheres of
the respective
'68
influence."
3. The American Doctrine
The leading American legal malpractice case applying the privity
doctrine is National Savings Bank v. Ward.69 In National Savings, an
attorney was hired by a purchaser of real property to examine the
seller's title in order for a mortgage lender to make a loan in reliance
upon the title examination.70 Later, the lender was unable to foreclose on the property when the purchaser defaulted because the attorney had negligently overlooked a prior recorded deed.7 ' In response,
the mortgage lender sued the attorney for malpractice.
The United States Supreme Court, following early English precedent, held in the absence of privity of contract there was no legally
enforceable duty between the parties.72 The National Savings Court
stated:
[T]he general rule is that the obligation of the attorney is to his
client and not to a third party, and unless there is something in the
66. Id. at 177.

67. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, § 7.4, at 364.
68. JOHN W. SALMOND,
69. 100 U.S. 195 (1880).
70. Id. at 195-196.
71. Id. at 198.

SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS

11 (16th ed. 1973).

72. Id. at 200-02.
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circumstances [fraud] of this case to take it out of the general rule, it
seems clear that the proposition of the defendant [that there is no
liability absent privity] must be sustained.73
The National Savings Court's reasoning was grounded in the same
public policy considerations enunciated by the earlier English courts:
[T]he person occasioning the loss must owe a duty, arising from
contract or otherwise, to the person sustaining such loss. Such a
restriction on the right to sue for a want of care in the exercise of
employments or the transaction of business is plainly necessary to
restrain the remedy from being pushed to an impracticable extreme.
There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the
ill effects of the negligence of men may be followed down the chain
of results to the final effect.74
Consequently, the National Savings Court held privity of contract
was necessary for recovery, and the lack of privity acted as a bar to
third party suits even when the attorney's negligence proximately
causes the injuries. 7 1 The principle effect of the NationalSavings decision was to limit an attorney's exposure to legal malpractice, thus
avoiding indeterminate litigation. Therefore, the initial American rule
was that attorneys could not be held liable in negligence for injuries
suffered by persons outside the direct attorney-client relationship.
Ironically, within the National Savings decision, the Supreme Court
opened the door to the first American exception to the privity doctrine. The Court stated "unless there is something in the circumstances of this case to take it out of the general rule ' 76 and "[n]either
fraud nor collusion is alleged or proved, '77 privity of contract is the
standard to be used. This same standard was later utilized by Justice
Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,7 s where he stated "[In the
absence of fraud] the ensuing liability for negligence is one that is
bounded by the contract, and is to be' 79enforced between the parties by
whom the contract has been made.
Nevertheless, throughout most of the industrial revolution, a majority of courts retained the privity doctrine because it was consistent
with pervasive public policy. 0 Many courts felt it necessary to fix certain definable boundaries on duty to permit entrepreneurs of the time
to predict the extent of their liability exposure. As Walter Probert
and Robert Hendricks state, "The enterpriser could chart his risks not
73. Id. at 200.
74. NationalSavings, 100 U.S. at 202.

75. Id at 200.

76. Id. at 200.

77. Id at 199.
78. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
79. Id at 448. Before addressing the negligence issue, the court reiterated that
privity was not required if fraud was pled and proved. Concluding that fraud was not
present, the privity issue became outcome determinative.
80. See, e.g., Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
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only by choosing
his contract relationships but also by means of the
contract itself."'' 8
However, as free wheeling capitalism began to give way to a more
controlled and regulated economy, it was inevitable that the concept
of duty would expand, and so too would the limitations on the privity
doctrine.82 Interestingly, most of the original cases limiting the doctrine first occurred in New York, a jurisdiction that presently strictly
adheres to the privity standard in legal malpractice cases.83
In Thomas v. Winchester,' the New York Court of Appeals held
that the privity doctrine should not apply in products liability cases.85
In Winchester, a pharmacist negligently mislabeled a deadly extract.86
A second pharmacist purchased the vial and unknowingly sold it to a
customer who was injured by the deadly extract.87 The customer sued
the original pharmacist who mislabeled the medicine.88
In response, the original pharmacist asserted he owed no duty of
care to the customer in the absence of contractual privity between
himself and the customer. 89 However, the New York Court of Appeals imposed liability on the original pharmacist in order to deter
future misconduct:
The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of his business and the
danger to others incident to its mismanagement. Nothing but mischief like that which actually happened could have been expected
from sending the poison falsely labeled into the market; and the
defendant is justly responsible for the probable consequences of the
act.90

Thereafter, not surprisingly, as the gasoline motor car with its propensity for personal injury began to replace the horse and carriage, additional exceptions to the privity doctrine began to replace the earlier
public policy concerns of indeterminate litigation.
For example, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,9' the New York
Court of Appeals limited application of the privity doctrine where
personal injuries result from negligently manufactured goods.92 In
MacPherson, Justice Cardozo concluded negligent vehicle manufacturers should be held liable to motorcar passengers who are injured as
81. Walter Probert & Robert A. Hendricks, IV, The Specter of Suits by Nonclients,
67 A.B.A. J. 720 (1981).
82. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93, at 622-27 (4th
ed. 1971).
83. See, e.g., Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
84. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).

85. Id. at 458-61.
86. Id. at 456.
87. Id. at 455-56.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 456-57.
90. Id. at 459.
91. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).

92. Id. at 1053.
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a result of manufacturing defects, even though the passengers lacked
privity of contract with the manufacturer. 93 The court found that the
defects in the automobile's wooden wheel could have been discovered
by reasonable inspection, therefore, the only issue was whether the
manufacturer owed a duty of care and vigilance to anyone but the
immediate purchaser. 4 Justice Cardozo relied on the Winchester exception and stated the privity doctrine did not further public policy
where personal injuries are involved:
There is here no break in the chain of cause and effect. In such
circumstances, the presence of a known danger, attendant upon a
known use, makes vigilance a duty. We have put aside the notion
that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of
negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.
We have put the source of the 95obligation where it ought to be. We
have put its source in the law.
As a result, the court held, "If the nature of a thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger.... [t]hen, irrespective of contract,
the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully." 96
Likewise, in Glanzer v. Shepard,97 the New York Court of Appeals
limited application of the privity doctrine in a negligent misrepresentation case. In Glanzer, a public weigher was hired by a seller to certify the weights and measures of certain goods.9' A third party buyer
relied on the certifications, and made a purchase that later turned out
to be inaccurate due to the negligent certification. 99 In permitting recovery, Justice Cardozo stated reliance by the third party was the end
and aim of the transaction. 10 0 Accordingly, the New York Court of
Appeals held that even though the weigher was hired by the seller,
and not the buyer, the weigher should be directly liable to the buyer
for negligent misrepresentation. 10 1
Cardozo's reasoning for imposing liability was based on the fact
that the public weigher provided the certification with the intention of
influencing the buyer's conduct, and therefore, a duty was owed to the
02
buyer as well as to the seller who actually hired the public weigher.'
The Glanzer court expressly disavowed the notion that privity of contract controlled: "The controlling circumstance is not the character of
93. Id at 1054-55.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
Id. at 275.
Id.

100. Id
101. Id. at 275-77.
102. Id. at 275-76.
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the consequence, but its proximity or remoteness in the thought and
purpose of the actor."'0 3 Thus, "[w]e state the defendant's obligation,
therefore, in terms, not of contract merely, but of duty."'"
Therefore, under Justice Cardozo's now universally recognized exceptions to the privity doctrine, the pendulum of public policy swung
from protecting the marketplace toward creating duties where third
party personal injuries were foreseeable, caused by negligent defendants, and redressable by the courts. 05 Moreover, because of their focus on the proximity of relationships, the intention of the contracting
parties, and foreseeability of injury, these exceptions to the privity
doctrine proved to be indispensable aspects in the development of the
American concept of third party standing in legal malpractice cases.
B. Relaxation of the Privity Doctrine
During the 1980's, the American Bar Association compiled statistics
which indicated 13% of all legal malpractice claims against attorneys
were brought by persons other than attorneys' clients.' 0 6 Approximately 18% of those claims related to estate planning matters."° Today, the majority of modern decisions favor relaxing the privity
doctrine in these circumstances, thereby allowing such third party
suits to proceed. 8 The ALR sets forth the general rule for relaxation
of the doctrine:
Whether an action by a nonclient against an attorney is based
upon a contract theory [third party beneficiary] or upon a negligence theory, there still must be alleged and shown that the plaintiff, if not the direct employer-client of the defendant attorney, is a
person or part of a class of persons specifically
intended to be the
09
beneficiary of the attorney's undertaking.'
Based upon this general principle, modern courts rely on two theories
to determine whether attorneys owe a duty to non-clients: the negligence theory, and the third party beneficiary theory. Texas courts,
however, preclude recovery under both theories. For example, in
Barcelo v. Elliott,10 the Houston First District Court of Appeals recently stated:
103. Id.at 276.
104. Id. at 277.
105. Id. at 275-77.
106. Profile of Legal Malpractice, ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyer's Professional
Liability (May 1986).
107. Id.
108. See supra note 27.
109. Joan Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render
Attorney Liable to Person Other Than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, 468
(1988).
110. 1995 WL 51054 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), affd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 607 (May 10, 1996).
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Under current Texas law, an attorney is only subject to suit by his
client for negligent preparation of estate planning documents. The
rationale behind this rule is that only a person with whom the attorney has privity has standing to sue for malpractice. Intermediate
courts of this state have applied this principle to preclude recovery
under both a tort and third party-beneficiary theory.' 1 '
Nonetheless, the majority of modern decisions in other jurisdictions
utilize one or both theories in relaxing the privity doctrine.
1. The Negligence Theory
The negligence theory from Biakanja attempts to establish a definition of duty based upon public policy considerations." 2 By focusing
almost exclusively on the extent to which a particular transaction affects a claimant, the negligence theory, with its multiple factor balancing test, is a logical extension of Cardozo's end and aim analysis from
Glanzer."3 Different from a third party beneficiary theory, the negligence theory is broader in its application, and includes persons who
may or may not be intended third party beneficiaries, but who may
foreseeably be injured by an attorney's negligence.
The first factor of the balancing test examines the extent a particular transaction is intended to affect an intended beneficiary. The terminology used in this factor invokes the same legal standard used to
determine whether a person is an intended beneficiary for purposes of4
determining the enforceability of third party beneficiary contracts."1
The second factor examines the foreseeability of harm to the beneficiary through conventional tort analysis. Even though the first factor
originates in contract law, and the second in tort, both serve the same
policy aim: the imposition of non-client liability on negligent attorneys. Moreover, in applying these factors, it is difficult to conceptualize circumstances where a will is drafted, providing for an intended
beneficiary, where no foreseeable harm results from the will's failure
due to negligent drafting.
A similar relationship exists between the third and fourth factors.
The third factor probes the degree of certainty that an intended beneficiary suffered harm. The fourth factor examines the closeness between the conduct complained of and the harm actually suffered.
Clearly, any investigation as to the closeness between conduct and
harm generally presupposes with certainty that some harm occurred.
Consequently, under this analysis, an attorney who prepares a will is
111. Barcelo, 1995 WL 51054 at *2 (citations omitted).

112. The California test involves various factors: 1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; 2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
3) the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury; 4) the closeness between the
attorney's conduct and the injury; and 5) the policy of preventing future harm. Id. at
19.
113. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
114. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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generally held liable for negligence if the attorney prepares the will
with the intent of transferring property to a beneficiary, and there is a
close connection between the legatee's loss and the attorney's
negligence.
The fifth factor is a pure policy determination as to whether finding
liability in a particular instance will prevent future harm. In practice,
this factor inevitably requires the imposition of liability. For instance,
if an attorney drafts a will with the intention of transferring property
to a beneficiary, and testamentary intent is frustrated by the attorney's
negligence, the policy of preventing future harm almost always requires imposition of liability.
In Heyer v. Flaig,15 the California Supreme Court applied the
Biakanja balancing test and reasoned when an attorney accepts responsibility for effectuating the testamentary scheme of a client, the
attorney "assumes a relationship not only with the client but also with
the client's intended beneficiaries."" 6 In Heyer, a testatrix hired an
attorney to draft a will with the intent to transfer her entire estate to
her two daughters. Shortly thereafter, the will was executed and the
woman remarried." 7 The attorney, however, failed to advise the testatrix that her post-testamentary spouse could claim a portion of her
estate under the California Probate Code, thus depriving the beneficiaries of their intended devise." 8 The testator died the following
year and under California law her former spouse was awarded a share
of her estate." 9 In response, the daughters, as intended third party
beneficiaries, sued the attorney for negligence due to his failure to
advise the mother that the
change in her marital status affected the
120
disposition of her estate.
Although the Heyer court limited its holding to a ruling on the statute of limitations, the court held the intended beneficiaries had standing to sue the attorney. 1 1 The court reasoned that in failing to carry
out a client's testamentary scheme, an attorney's acts and omissions
not only affect the success of a client's testamentary scheme, but possibility of injury to intended beneficiaries is equally foreseeable. 22
The Heyer court recognized that this case was similar to the breach of
duty found in Lucas, and extended a duty to the beneficiaries for public policy reasons, recognizing that unless will beneficiaries can recover against attorneys, no one can do12 3so, thereby frustrating the
social policy of preventing future harm.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
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2.

The Third Party Beneficiary Theory

The third party beneficiary theory probes whether the primary purpose of the attorney's retention is to provide legal services for the
benefit of the injured claimant. 1 24 This analysis examines to what extent the transaction was intended to affect a particular beneficiary.
Under the third party beneficiary theory, third party intended beneficiaries may sue attorneys who negligently draft wills, if the beneficiaries can show that a testator entered the attorney-client
relationship with the expressed intent of conferring a benefit on
them. 25 Consequently, under this theory, an enforceable duty arises
for intended beneficiaries while no duty exists for incidental
beneficiaries.
For example, if a testator hires an attorney to prepare a will and
manifests an expressed intent to benefit a particular person, then the
intended beneficiary has standing to maintain a malpractice action
against the attorney, if the beneficiary fails to receive his devise due to
the attorney's negligence. To distinguish between intended beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries, the Restatement of Contracts
states in pertinent part:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between the promisor and promisee,
a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental126beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.

In Guy v. Liederbach,2 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on
the third party beneficiary theory and held that a named beneficiary,
who was also the named executrix, could maintain a cause of action
against an attorney who drafted the will. 128 In Guy, the attorney had
directed the beneficiary to witness the will, thus voiding her entire
legacy and her appointment as executrix. 1 29 Consequently, the court
held that the plaintiff had a cause of action as a third party
beneficiary:
The underlying contract is that between the testator and the attorney for the drafting of a will. The will, providing for one or more
named beneficiaries, clearly manifests the intent of the testator to
124. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 384-85.
125. See, e.g., Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 750 (Pa. 1983).

126.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 302 (1979).

127. 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983).
128. Id. at 752-53.

129. Id. at 746.
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benefit the legatee. Under Restatement (Second) § 302(1), the recognition of the 'right to performance in the beneficiary' would be
'appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties' since the estate either cannot or will not bring suit ....

Being named benefi-

ciaries of the will, the legatees are intended, rather than incidental,
beneficiaries . . . for whom 'the circumstances indicate that the

promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.' In the case of a testator-attorney contract, the attorney is the promisor, promising to draft a will which carries out the
testator's intention to benefit the legatees. The testator is the promisee, who intends that the named beneficiaries have the benefit of
the attorney's promised performance. The circumstances which
clearly indicate the testator's intent to benefit a named legatee
130 are
his arrangements with the attorney and the text of his will.
Not surprisingly, this specifically named legatee limitation appeals to
attorney-defendants who contend the extension of recovery to third
13 1
party beneficiaries will result in a "vast range of potential liability.'
The Guy court retained the requirement of strict privity in actions
against attorneys for negligence, stating, "[W]e agree with the appellants that the Lucas standard is too broad ....
3. A Tort or Contract Theory
A number of jurisdictions recognize causes of action in either tort
or contract, typically placing a claimant in a position to elect to proceed under one or both theories. Professors Prosser and Keeton,
however, find the distinctions between the two theories troublesome.
Consequently, they have expressed hope that the availability of a contract or tort theory, for the same kind of loss with different requirebe reduced in order to
ments for both plaintiffs and defendants, will
133
simplify the law and reduce litigation CoStS.
In Stowe v. Smith, 3 the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the

plaintiffs could pursue either remedy when there was no conflict between the rules of contract and tort. 35 In Stowe, an attorney prepared
a will in accordance with instructions from the testator to provide onehalf of the estate in trust for the plaintiff.' 36 The will was admitted to
probate but due to an alleged drafting mistake the plaintiff was forced
to accept a settlement of only three-fourths the intended devise. 3 7
Consequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant as a third party benefi130. Id. at 751-52.
131. Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. Guy, 459 A.2d at 746.
133. W. PAGE

at 655
134.
135.
136.
137.

KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 92,

(5th ed. 1984).
441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981).
Id at 84.
Id. at 82.
Id
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ciary of the defendant's agreement with the testatrix. In holding that
the plaintiff could maintain such a suit in either contract or tort, the
Connecticut Supreme Court stated, "Unless a particular conflict bea plaintiff may
tween the rules of contract and tort requires otherwise,
138
choose to proceed in contract, tort, or both.
Likewise, in Schreimer v. Scoville,'139 the Iowa Supreme Court allowed a cause of action under a contract or tort theory by a beneficiary against an attorney who drafted a will that resulted in failure of
the intended devise.' 40 In Scoville, an attorney prepared a will and
codicil which named a devisee who was to receive land. 4 ' The same
attorney, however, continued to represent the testator and aided the
testator in a partition sale of the same land. 142 Consequently, the intended gift was determined adeemed. 4 3 In allowing the devisee's suit
to proceed, the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
In light of... various policy considerations, we conclude a lawyer
owes a duty of care to the direct, intended, and specifically identifiable beneficiaries of the testator as expressed in the testator's testamentary instruments. The thrust of any action brought by such an
individual, whether couched in terms of contract or tort
1 necessarily
will center on the existence and breach of this duty. '"
C. Negligence and Legal Malpractice
1. Historical Antecedents
Historically, there has been great readiness to hold defendants liable for acts or omissions in connection with some affirmative line of
conduct in which they engaged or for a dangerous condition they created.' 45 According to one commentator, "The law of negligence...
start[ed] from the idea of failure in the performance of a determinable
provable legal duty" such as that which arises from a statute or prescription of the nature of the defendant's calling as a public or common one.' 46 Therefore, historically, a duty of care was imposed on a
person who undertook to do a thing, "with47 or about another's property, or to do something with or to him.'
Because negligence originally developed in circumstances where a
defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff based on some relationship between them, many courts viewed negligence as being correlative to a
138. Id. at 84 (citation omitted).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

410 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1987).
Id at 682.
Id at 680.
Id
Id
Id at 682 (citation omitted).
Bohlen, supra note 40, at 210-14.1 THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATION

147. Id at 187.
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duty not to cause harm to a plaintiff in the manner in which he was
complaining.' 48 Courts familiarized themselves with the concept of
negligence arising from the need to determine whether a particular
injury was "said to be a sufficiently proximate consequence of the defendant's act to entail liability.' 1 49 Early courts answered this question by asking whether any ordinarily prudent man would have
foreseen that damage might result from his act.' 50 As a result, the
basis of duty, under the modern law of negligence, is the duty to use
the lack
care toward those who might foreseeably be harmed because
15
of care involves an unreasonable probability of harm.
2.

Modern Applications

The modern tort of legal malpractice, like any negligence action,
consists of three principal elements. First, the attorney must owe a
duty to the injured party. Second, the attorney must breach that duty.
And third, the injuries suffered must be proximately caused by such
breach.'52 However, the legal issues of causation and damages in estate planning legal malpractice cases differ from those in other legal
malpractice actions. In other areas, the elements of causation and
damages are generally difficult to prove. However, this is not necessarily true in estate planning cases.
For example, if a legal malpractice action is based on an attorney's
failure to file a suit within the applicable statute of limitations, a plaintiff must prove that the attorney's action (or inaction) was the proximate cause of the injury, and that the plaintiff would have recovered
but for the attorney's negligence. 153 Therefore, the plaintiff must
prove two distinct elements: that the attorney was negligent in not
filing the suit within the statute of limitations, and if the suit would
have been filed in a timely manner, the plaintiff would have been successful in his recovery. Once the causal connection between the attorney's action and the loss is proven, damages may be established, and
the amount of damages is measured by what the plaintiff would have
received if his original suit had been properly filed.'54
In estate planning cases, however, errors by attorneys generally
avoid these difficult areas of proof. For instance, in some jurisdictions,
if a named legatee in a will is allowed to serve as an attesting witness,
148. Id. at 187-88.
149. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 450 (2d ed. 1937).
150. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916).
151. Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 41, 44
(1934). However, Winfield felt there was no sound historical basis for this limitation
on the duty to use care.
152. Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Wash. 1994).
153. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Coon
v. Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Jackson v. Urban, 516 S.W.2d
948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. Jackson, 516 S.W.2d at 949.
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the legatee must forfeit his particular devise.' 55 In these circumstances, assuming breach of duty is proven, it is obvious that by allowing the legatee to serve as an attesting witness, the attorney
proximately caused the legatee's failure to receive his bequest, and the
amount of damages is the value of the lost legacy. Yet, while causation and damages in estate planning cases may seem to present little
problem, third party recovery remains subject to the privity doctrine
in many jurisdictions.
II.

THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE IN MODERN TEXAS LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CASES

Interestingly, most recent Texas non-client estate planning legal
malpractice cases may be categorized into two distinct groups. The
first group is composed of what may be called discretionary cases:
cases arising as a result of an attorney having advised a client-testator
of the relevant law, but leaving any subsequent action or inaction up
to the client or attorney's discretion, and consequently, the exercise of
such discretion results in injury to a third party beneficiary.1 56 An
example of this occurs when an attorney advises a client that he must
change the signature card on a particular funds account in order to
fulfill testamentary intent, but during his lifetime, the testator fails to
change the signature card, thereby resulting in frustration of testamentary intent, and loss to the intended beneficiary.
The second group can be categorized as non-discretionary cases:
cases arising as a result of the testator's attorney failing to comply
with the ministerial requirements necessary for properly preparing
and executing a will under the Texas Probate Code,' 57 thus resulting in
155. See, e.g., Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419, 422 (La. Ct. App. 1971).

156. Black's Law Dictionary defines discretionary acts as follows:
Those acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that
one must or must not take and, if there is [a] clearly defined rule, such would
eliminate discretion. Option open to [individuals] to act or not as they deem
proper or necessary.... One which requires exercise in judgment and choice
and involves what is just and proper under the circumstances.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 244 (5th ed. 1983).
157. Section 59(a) of the Texas Probate Code states:
Every last will and testament, except where otherwise provided by law, shall
be in writing and signed by testator in person or by another person for him
by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly in the handwriting of the testator, be attested by two or more credible witnesses above the
age of fourteen years who shall subscribe their names thereto in their own
handwriting in the presence of the testator.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59(a) (West Supp. 1996).

Furthermore, according to one commentator, the importance of properly preparing
a will should never be minimized:
[Attorneys] should approach [estate planning] with a realization that to the
By
client the will is probably the most important document of his life ....
disposition of his property he intends to make provisions for other persons,
generally for persons close and dear to him. The property may be the result
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injury to a third party beneficiary. An example of a non-discretionary
case arises when an attorney allows an intended beneficiary to act as a
subscribing witness, thereby resulting in the intended beneficiary failing to receive his intended devise.
A. DiscretionaryCases
In Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C.,158 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals declined to break with the Texas privity rule, holding that an attorney owes no duty to a third party in the absence of
privity of contract. 5 9 Berry was a case of first impression in Texas:
whether the privity requirement precludes a negligence action
brought by the intended beneficiaries of a testator's estate against attorneys who failed to prepare a new will in accordance with the testator's instructions prior to his death. 60 In Berry, the testator hired the
defendants while he was hospitalized with terminal cancer to prepare
a new will to provide for his wife's children from a previous marriage,
as beneficiaries, on an equal basis with his own children. 16 However,
the testator died approximately sixty days after his initial consultation
with the defendants. 162 During this time period, although the defendants had prepared a draft of the new will, the testator, exercising his
own discretion, never executed the new will before his death. 163 Con-.
sequently, his previous will, excluding the children, was admitted to
probate.' 64 As a result, the testator's wife sued the defendants for
negligence.
Not surprisingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was
premised solely on the lack of privity and the lack of duty owed to the
plaintiff.165 However, the plaintiff argued that privity did exist on the
basis of two telephone conversations she had with the defendants
while they were assisting the testator. 166 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 67 On appeal, in affirming summary judgment, the San Antonio Court of Appeals stated, "While [the
of a lifetime of effort. Its dispositions will have lasting and significant effect

....Although the will is subject to change during the client's lifetime, his
death will seal it forever, good or bad, right or wrong .... If the lawyer

doubts his ability to produce the best possible will for the client, he should
decline to prepare one.
John S. Miller, Functions and Ethical Problems of the Lawyer in Drafting a Will, 1950
U. ILL. L.F. 415, 423.

158.
1987).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

717 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986), rev'd, 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.

Id. at 719.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 717.
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plaintiff] assisted her husband in communicating with [the defendants], her testimony does not establish a fact issue as to the existence
of an attorney-client relationship between her or her family and [the
defendants].'

68

Similarly, in Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins, 69 the Houston First
District Court of Appeals held the privity requirement "is well-reasoned and should not be 'relaxed' in a case brought against an attorney by parties who are not the attorney's clients, but who are instead
would-be 'third party beneficiaries' of the attorney-client relationship."' 7 ° In Thompson, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for wrongdoing in the handling of trust property.' 7 ' The plaintiffs were residual
trust beneficiaries under their aunt's will.' 72 The aunt provided in her
will that "the residue of her estate, after some specific bequests were
made, was to be placed in a trust for the protection and well-being of
her husband" and the plaintiffs.' 73 The principal asset in the estate
was the aunt's interest in the stock of a corporation. 174 The defendants were in turn hired by the trustee to represent the estate and trust
in the process of distributing the trust's assets including the plaintiff's
stock in the corporation. 175 The plaintiffs, however, alleged that the
defendants implemented a plan to manipulate the plaintiffs into
agreeing to take only book value for their stock under a redemption
to
plan offered by the corporation. 76 Allegedly, the defendants failed 177
disclose to the plaintiffs that they also represented the corporation.
under several theories, including
The plaintiffs sued the defendants
"professional negligence.' 1 78 In response, the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs did not have standing to assert such a claim due to the
lack of privity. 179 The defendants moved for summary judgment,
claiming that "an attorney is not liable to . . . those not in privity to

attorneys ...for alleged failure to perform duties which the attorney
owes only to his clients."'818 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants.' '
168. Id at 718.

169. 859 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
170. Id at 622 (citing Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
171. Id. at 618.
172. Id at 619.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id.at 620.
177. Id
178. Id
179. Id at 621. Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e)).
180. Id. (citing Dickey, 731 S.W.2d at 582)).
181. Id It should be noted that the summary judgment was based on the plaintiffs'
conversion claim.
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On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants wrongly advised the corporation that the plaintiffs' stock was subject to redemption. 182 However, the Houston First Court of Appeals stated, "Any
claim here for the allegedly wrong advice supplied by the attorney
rests with the wrongly advised party itself."' 183 Consequently, the
Houston court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.
Recently, in Oliver v. West,'" the Eastland Court of Appeals held
that an attorney owes no duty to the heirs of a client for allegedly
mishandling preparation of the client's will and for failing to properly
ensure that the testator's intentions were ultimately fulfilled. 185 In Oliver, the plaintiffs asserted that their father hired the defendant to prepare a will to reflect their father's intention to divide certain IRA
funds equally into thirds between the father's wife and the plaintiffs. 1 86 However, the signature cards on the IRA accounts designated
the funds
the wife as the primary beneficiary, and 8 consequently,
7
passed to the wife upon the father's death.1
The plaintiffs, as third party beneficiaries, sued the defendant for
negligence and breach of contract.' s The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending the plaintiffs were not in privity, and
presented evidence that the defendant had told the father to check the
signature cards at the bank and thus it was up to the father's discretion
to change the cards since they did not reflect testamentary intent. 89
The trial court granted summary judgment. 90 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued the defendant's summary judgment evidence was hearsay
and therefore inadmissible.' 9 ' However, the Eastland Court of Appeals held the evidence "was not material to the trial court's granting
of summary judgment because it did not relate to the issues of duty,
privity, or lack of standing."'9392 Consequently, the Eastland court affirmed summary judgment.'
B. Non-Discretionary Cases
In Dickey v. Jansen, 94 the Houston First District Court of Appeals
held Texas law does not recognize a cause of action against an attorney for negligently preparing a will asserted by one not in privity with
182. Id. at 624.
183. Id.

184.
185.
186.
187.

908 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, n.w.h.).
Id. at 630-31.
Id. at 631.
Id.

188. Id.

189. Id.
190. Id. at 630.
191. Id. at 631.

192. Il

193. Id. at 630.

194. 731 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the testator's attorney. 195 In Dickey, the plaintiffs' brother hired the
defendant to create a trust payable as a life estate to his wife with the
remainder payable to the plaintiff. 19 6 The trust was to have included
mineral interests located in Louisiana. 97 However, under Louisiana
law the trust provision in the will was invalid and unenforceable. 19
As a result, the plaintiffs alleged that due to the defendant's negligence, "the testator's Lousiana properties never became part of the
trust res, resulting in their damage and loss."'" Furthermore, the
plaintiffs contended the defendant "had either actual or constructive
knowledge that the trust provisions violated Louisiana law."2 ° The
plaintiffs sued the attorney for ineffectually preparing the trust provision. In response, the attorney filed for summary judgment arguing
"an attorney is not liable to... those not in privity with attorneys...
for alleged failure to perform duties which the attorney owes only to
his clients." ' ' On appeal, the Houston First District Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant and held "Texas
law does not recognize a negligence cause of action in these circumstances, on the theory that an attorney owes a duty only to those par2 2
ties in privity of contract with him."
2
°3
In Thomas v. Pryor, the Dallas Court of Appeals held a named
beneficiary of a will may not sue an attorney for negligence who allegedly fails to have a will properly signed by witnesses resulting in loss
of the beneficiary's legacy.
In Pryor, a pro bono legal aid attorney
prepared a will which named the plaintiff as the beneficiary of the
residue of the testator's estate.20 5 However, the will was not admitted
to probate due to the attorney's failure to have the will signed, and
consequently, the plaintiff, as a named third party beneficiary, sued
the attorney for negligence.20 6 In declining an "invitation to change
existing Texas law prohibiting a beneficiary named in a will from
bringing a suit for professional malpractice against an attorney who
prepared the will, ' 2 7 the Dallas Court of Appeals reasoned:
Such liability would inject undesirable self-protective reservations
into the attorney's counseling role. The attorney's preoccupation or
concern with the possibility of claims based on mere negligence (as
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584 (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 582.

202. Id.(citations omitted).

203. 847 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), writ dism'd by agr., 863 S.W.2d 462
(Tex. 1993).
204. Mdt
at 304-05.
205. Id.at 303-04.

206. IdM
at 304.
207. Itt at 303.
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distinguished from fraud) by any with whom his client might deal
would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's
interest. The result would be both an undue burden on the profession and a diminution in the quality of the legal services received by
the client.
We must also reflect on the importance of the confidentiality that
arises from the attorney-client relationship. The established rule is
that an attorney cannot testify as to confidential communications
made to the attorney by the client over the objection of the client or
his heirs. Regarding drafting or executing a will, the privilege is effective during the testator's lifetime, but after the testator's death
the attorney may testify to facts affecting the execution or contents
of the will. Opening such scrutiny to third parties, such as will beneficiaries, would jeopardize the integrity of the testator's confidential
communications to the testator's attorney.2 °8
Similarly, in Barcelo v. Elliott,2 ° 9 the Houston First District Court of
Appeals held that under Texas law, an attorney is only subject to suit
by his clients for negligent preparation of estate planning documents.2 1 ° In Barcelo, the plaintiffs' grandmother retained the defendant to prepare a will and an inter vivos trust agreement to include the
plaintiffs as beneficiaries of a trust.2 ' The grandmother subsequently
died and the will was admitted to probate. The probate court, for
reasons not disclosed in the trial record, entered judgment that the
trust agreement was invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law.212
As a result, the plaintiffs agreed to settle for what they contended was
a substantially smaller share of the estate than they would have received pursuant to the valid trust.21 3 In turn, the plaintiffs sued the
defendant for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants based on no evidence
of privity.2 14 On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted two arguments:
(1) public policy warrants the imposition of liability upon an attorney who negligently drafts estate planning documents that cause
loss to the intended beneficiaries of such documents; and (2) writ
histories of recent Texas intermediate appellate decisions indicate
that the Texas Supreme Court is prepared to consider whether intended beneficiaries of an attorney-client agreement to prepare estate planning documents may sue the attorney for negligent
208. Id. at 305 (quoting Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

209. 1995 WL 51054 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), aff'd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 607 (May 10, 1996).
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id
213. Id.
214. Id.
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preparation of such documents based upon a contractual third-party
beneficiary theory. 15
However, in affirming summary judgment for the defendants, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held "the plaintiffs in this
2 16
case did not state a valid cause of action under existing Texas law.
On May 10, 1996, the Texas Supreme Court decided Barcelo.217
The issue as presented was "whether an attorney who negligently
drafts a will or trust agreement owes a duty of care to persons intended to benefit under the will or trust, even though the attorney
never represented the intended beneficiaries. ' 218 The court held
"[b]ecause the attorney did not represent the beneficiaries, we . . .
conclude that he owed no professional duty to them. We accordingly
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. ' 21 9 In so doing, the Texas
Supreme Court refused to follow "[t]he majority of other states addressing this issue ' 22 0 who have relaxed the privity barrier in the estate planning context. Instead, the court agreed "with those courts
that have rejected a broad cause of action in favor of beneficiaries,...
recogniz[ing] the inevitable problems disappointed heirs have with attempting to prove that a defendant-attorney failed to implement the
deceased testator's intentions."2 21
The court reasoned, "This potential tort liability to third parties
would create a conflict during the estate planning process, dividing the
attorney's loyalty between his or her client and the third party beneficiaries. 2 22 The court addressed the potential conflicts that might
arise:
Plaintiffs contend in part that Elliott was negligent in failing to fund
the trust during Barcelo's lifetime, and in failing to obtain a signature from the trustee. These alleged deficiencies, however, could
have existed pursuant to Barcelo's instructions, which may have
been based on advice from her attorneys attempting to represent
her best interests. An attorney's ability to render such advice would
be severely compromised if the advice could be second-guessed 2by
2
persons named as beneficiaries under the unconsummated trust.
III. ABOLISHING THE PRIvrry DOCTRINE IN TEXAS
Recently, the American Law Institute, in its Restatement (Third) of

Law Governing Lawyers, attempted to set forth limited circumstances
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id at *1.
Id
39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (May 10, 1996).
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id at 609.
Id
Id

223. Id at 610.
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in which attorneys would owe a duty of care to third party non-clients.
Section 73 of Tentative Draft No. 7 states:
For the purposes of liability . . . a lawyer owes a duty to use care
(1) To a prospective client...
(2) To a non-client when and to the extent that the lawyer or
(with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal
services, the non-client so relies, and the non-client is not, under
applicable law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to
protection;
(3) To a non-client when and to the extent that the lawyer knows
that a client intends the lawyer's services to benefit the non-client,
and such a duty substantially promotes enforcement of the lawyer's
obligations to the client and would not create inconsistent duties
significantly impairing the lawyer's performance of those obligations; and
(4) To a non-client when and to the extent that circumstances
known to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate action by the
lawyer is necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the
representation:
(a) To prevent a crime imminently threatening to cause
death or serious bodily injury to an identifiable person who is unaware of the risk; or
(b) To prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed
by a client to a non-client, when the non-client is not reasonably
able to protect its rights and such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of the lawyer's obligations to the client.
Furthermore, the authors set forth the following illustrations regarding potential application of Section 73:
Client retains Lawyer to prepare and help in the execution of a
will leaving Client's estate to Non-client. Lawyer prepares the will
naming Non-client as the sole beneficiary, but negligently arranges
for Client to sign it before an inadequate number of witnesses. Client's intent to benefit Non-client thus appears on the face of the will
executed by Client. After Client dies, the will is held ineffective due
to the lack of witnesses, and Non-client is thereby harmed. Lawyer
is subject to liability to Non-client for legal malpractice in drafting
the will.
The facts being otherwise as stated in [paragraph 1], Lawyer arranges for Client to sign the will before the proper number of witnesses, but Non-client later alleges that Lawyer negligently wrote
224.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 73 (Tentative

Draft No. 7, 1994). It should be noted that as of this publication date, the tentative
draft had not been considered by the members of the American Law Institute, therefore, it should not be considered as representing the position of the Institute on any of
the issues presented. Nonetheless, it serves to illustrate the potential for drafting a
bright-line non-client standing rule.
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the will to name someone other than Non-client as the legatee. Client's intent to benefit Non-client thus does not appear on the face
of the will. Non-client can establish the existence of a duty from
Lawyer to Non-client only by producing reliable evidence that Client intended Non-client to be the legatee.
The facts being otherwise as stated in [paragraph 1], Lawyer arranges for Client to sign the will before the proper number of witnesses. After Client's death, Heir has the will set aside on the
ground that Client was incompetent, and then sues Lawyer for expenses imposed on Heir by the will, alleging that Lawyer negligently
assisted Client to execute a will despite Client's incompetence.
Lawyer is not subject to liability to Heir. Recognizing a duty by
lawyers to heirs to use care in not assisting incompetent clients to
execute wills would impair performance of lawyer's duty to assist
clients even when the client's competence might later be
challenged. 225
Not surprisingly, these illustrations clearly demonstrate a distinction
between discretionary and non-discretionaryacts or omissions made
by clients or attorneys regarding estate planning matters. However,
there is an inherent problem with this Restatement. It suffers from
the same overinclusiveness and uncertainty of liability as its predecessors, the California negligence theory and the third party beneficiary
theory.
The California theory, as well as the third party beneficiary theory,
have both proven overly broad in their application. The negligence
theory, with its multiple factor public policy balancing test, almost always requires imposition of liability when an attorney prepares a will
that results in frustration of testamentary intent because it is almost
always foreseeable that will beneficiaries failing to receive their legacies suffer harm. Thus, imposition of liability is necessary to prevent
future harms.
Likewise, the third party beneficiary theory requires imposition of
liability if a testator expresses an intent to benefit a third party, and
the third party fails to receive his intended devise regardless of the
reason for its failure. Neither theory considers whether the act or
omission giving rise to the loss was the result of an exercise of discretion by the client or attorney, and neither theory is administratively
efficient, each requiring a case-by-case analysis to determine such
liability.
Recently, conceding defeat in its effort to structure a bright-line
rule, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
In sum, we are unable to craft a bright-line rule that allows a lawsuit to proceed where alleged malpractice causes a will or trust to
fail in a manner that casts no real doubt on the testator's intentions,
while prohibiting actions in other situations. We believe the greater
225. Id § 73 (Comment b, Illustrations 2-4).
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good is served by preserving a bright-line privity rule which denies a
cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the attorney did not represent. This will ensure that attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties
compromising that representation. 2 6
This recent decision begs the question whether Texas estate planning
attorneys should always escape third party liability regardless of the
severity of their malfeasance? If not, could the distinction between
discretionary and non-discretionary cases be a relevant factor in the
structuring of a bright-line rule to determine third party non-client
standing as an alternative to the privity doctrine? If so, what type of
rule would constitute a reasonable compromise between the need to
provide attorneys with certainty and predictability as to third parties
who may maintain suits against them and the necessity to provide adequate redress for injured third party will beneficiaries?
Here is one proposal:
A lawyer shall be strictly liable to a non-client for damages resulting
from an act (or failure to act) in the course of representation,
whether by the attorney or client, only if the act (or failure to act)
could not have been the result of an exercise of discretion by the
client represented. In the absence of fraud or other intentional tort,
a lawyer shall not otherwise be liable to a non-client for any act (or
failure to act) in the course of representation. 2 7
Under this proposed rule, a duty is established when the act or
omission is not the result of a discretionary act exercised by the client
or attorney, or in other words, strict liability is imposed for all nondiscretionaryacts leading to third party injury. For instance, Texas attorneys would be held strictly liable for such non-discretionaryacts as
failing to follow the proper procedures for preparing and executing a
will under the Texas Probate Code, for wrongly advising a client of the
proper law, or for drafting testamentary documents that later prove
invalid as a result of the attorney's negligence. Yet, no liability would
arise for discretionaryacts or omissions committed by either clients or
attorneys leading to third party injury such as when a testator fails to
change the signature card on an IRA account in order to fulfill testamentary intent. This strict liability rule for non-discretionary acts or
omissions is logical in that causation and damages are easily established in most estate planning cases, therefore the only issue in contention is whether an attorney should owe a duty to third party nonclients.
226. Barcelo, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 610.
227. This rule was developed by Professor Walter Win. Hofheinz, Associate Professor at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. This author served as a research
assistant on a more comprehensive article by Professor Hofheinz regarding the same
subject matter. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to him for his assistance with this comment.
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For example, in Thomas v. Pryor,2 28 the pro bono legal aid attorney
failed to have the testator's will properly executed, therefore the will
was not admitted to probate and the beneficiary of the residue of the
testator's estate was denied her legacy.22 9 Predictably, the Dallas
Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for the attorney due to
the lack of privity between the attorney and the plaintiff. 230 More-

over, the Pryor court discussed at length the undesirable results that
might arise if attorneys were preoccupied with third party liability resulting in attorneys' inability to devote their entire energies to their
client's interests.23 '
However, if the pro bono attorney was not qualified to properly
prepare a will, one of the most important documents an individual
may prepare in his life, then he should have declined the representation.23 2 More importantly, under the proposed strict liability rule, the
attorney would have owed a duty to the beneficiary. Having breached
that duty, the attorney would be strictly liable for his negligence, and
therefore the beneficiary could have recovered damages in the
amount of her lost legacy. It is notable that the Pryor court showed
little concern for the beneficiary's loss suffered as a result of an apparently incompetent attorney. Furthermore, it strains logic to understand how properly following the law in preparing testamentary
documents will result in an attorney not devoting his entire energy to
his client's interest. The principal purpose of an estate planning representation is to fulfill testamentary intent by properly preparing and
executing the testator's will.
In contrast, the attorney in Oliver v. West 233 would owe no duty to

the third party beneficiary under the proposed rule. In Oliver, the
attorney presented summary judgment evidence that he had advised
the testator to change the signature cards on an IRA funds account in
order to reflect the testator's testamentary intent.234 However, during
his lifetime, the testator failed to change the signature cards, resulting
in frustration of testamentary intent and third party beneficiary
lOSS. 235 Thus, the attorney clearly left the necessary acts regarding fulfillment of testamentary intent up to the client's discretion after properly advising the client of the necessity for such acts. In other words,
the attorney did everything possible to fulfill his duty to his client, and
in no way did the attorney's acts or omissions lead to the loss suffered
228. 847 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), writ dism'd by agr., 863 S.W.2d 462
(Tex. 1993).

229. Id at 303-04.
230. Id at 305.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id
Miller, supra note 157, at 423.
908 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, n.w.h.).
Id. at 631.
Id

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

31

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 2 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 6

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

by the beneficiaries. Therefore, under the proposed rule, the Oliver
attorney would not be held liable for the beneficiary's loss.
Similarly, in Barcelo v. Elliot,236 an attorney was retained to prepare
a will and an inter vivos trust agreement that later was found to be
invalid and unenforceable as matter of law. 237 Under the proposed
rule, the attorney would be held liable for the failure of such testamentary documents. However, no reason was given in Barcelo for the
probate court's ruling as to the invalidity of the will in the trial court
record.238 Under the proposed rule, the burden would remain on the
plaintiff to provide an adequate trial record to distinguish between
discretionary and non-discretionary acts which lead to the beneficiary's loss. Therefore, in the absence of such evidence, even though he
negligently drafted invalid testamentary documents, the attorney
should not be held liable for negligence.
Obviously, the proposed rule needs further examination and analysis. Issues including the availability of punitive damages for intentional acts such as fraud or breach of fiduciary duty should be
examined. For instance, different types of damages might be available
for different types of wrongdoing to deter fiduciary misconduct. Nevertheless, the principal purpose of setting forth this proposed rule is to
illustrate that structuring a bright-line, non-client standing rule as an
alternative to the current privity standard is possible.
Recently, one commentator stated, "The long-established concept
of privity, which forged a bond between lawyers and their clients
through good times and bad, is crumbling. ' 239 Yet proponents continue to argue that it would be unfair to expose attorneys to the slippery slope of indeterminate liability if the current privity rule is
relaxed.2 4 But, is it not equally unfair to allow attorneys to completely escape liability for causing harm to intended third party beneficiaries regardless of the severity of the attorney's malfeasance?
Last, it should be noted that many arguments favoring the privity
doctrine arise from an attorney's duties as described in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For example, Texas attorneys are subject
to rule EC 5-1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of 24
third
persons
1
should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
236. 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (May 10, 1996).
237. Id. at 608.
238. Id.
239. James Podgers, Third-Party Problems, 81 A.B.A. J. 64, 64 (Dec. 1995).
240. Id.
241. State Bar Rules, art. X, § 9, EC 5-1 (Texas Code of Professional Responsibility), reprinted in TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West 1988).
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Further, under the Model Rules, whether an attorney owes a duty to a
non-client third party depends upon the balancing of an attorney's
duty to represent his clients vigorously with an attorney's duty not to
provide misleading information to third parties who may foreseeably
rely on such information.242 Obviously, the State Bar would need to
reexamine its rules of professional conduct, to ensure conformity with
any bright-fine, non-client standing rule.
CONCLUSION

It is time Texas joined the modern majority of jurisdictions that
have relaxed the privity doctrine. It is unfair for Texas attorneys to
negligently harm third party will beneficiaries regardless of the severity or reason for their malfeasance without some kind of redress available for the injured parties. The Barcelo court was correct in its
reasoning that a bright-line rule is needed to avoid opening the flood
gates of indeterminate litigation. It is time the Texas Supreme Court
structured such a rule to discourage and deter future misconduct by
negligent estate planning attorneys, yet at the same time provide protection for Texas attorneys against indeterminate liability.
Lief Kjehl Rasmussen
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